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The urban class structure: class change and spatial divisions 
from a multidimensional class perspective
Gijs Custers and Godfried Engbersen
Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Social class plays a central role in understanding the urban struc-
ture, yet its conceptualization and operationalization in urban stu-
dies are limited. We have used the Bourdieusian conception of 
social class, which conceives of class as the possession of economic, 
social and cultural capital, to establish the class structure of 
Rotterdam. We make a theoretical contribution to the literature 
by discussing how this conception provides new insights into the 
professionalization-polarization debate. Furthermore, we examine 
the spatial distributions of different class fractions, known as the 
geography of class. Based on two waves of a comprehensive city 
survey, we applied latent class analysis to develop an elaborate 
class typology consisting of seven social classes. We investigate 
how the class structure developed between 2008 and 2017 and 
analyze the changes in spatial class divisions. Our findings show 
that the transformation of the class structure is mainly driven by 
changes in cultural capital, that is, middle classes with high cultural 
capital replacing lower and middle classes with low cultural capital. 
Spatial analyses further reveal that classes are dispersed in specific 
ways and that these patterns of dispersion change over time. 
Finally, we reflect on the relevance of Bourdieu’s work in studying 
the urban class structure
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Research on the social structure of the city and its spatial divisions has a longstanding 
tradition in the social sciences. Classic examples are works by Du Bois (1899) and Warner 
and Lunt (1941), who conducted comprehensive studies that captured many social and 
spatial dimensions of race and class in American cities. Nowadays, with the abundant 
availability of different kinds of data, several ways of studying the urban structure have 
become possible (Parker et al., 2007). In this study we focus on social class as a central 
and multidimensional concept for understanding the urban structure, a sociological 
perspective that has been relatively absent in urban studies until now (Boterman et al., 
2018; Cunningham, 2019; Ljunggren & Andersen, 2015).
Social class is understood here as the possession of economic, social and cultural 
capital (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986), a conceptualization that follows from the field of “cultural 
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class analysis” (see Devine & Savage, 2005; Flemmen, 2013; Savage, Warde et al., 2005). 
One powerful argument for bringing social class into research on urban structures is that 
“traditional” measures such as income or employment provide a limited perspective on 
the urban structure and spatial divisions (Ljunggren & Andersen, 2015). Social class 
research shows that people with similar economic positions may widely differ in their 
social and cultural orientations (e.g. Bennett et al., 2009).
This heterogeneity in especially the middle class has spatial manifestations as well, as 
different middle-class fractions have diverging residential orientations (Bacqué et al., 
2015; Boterman & Musterd, 2017; Boterman et al., 2018; Bridge, 2006; Butler & Robson, 
2001; Savage, Bagnall et al., 2005). Lower classes, on the other hand, are usually more 
restricted in their residential options, which may result in spatial concentrations (cf. 
Slater, 2013). The links between class and geography have been investigated in multiple 
other studies (Cunningham, 2019; Cunningham & Savage, 2015, 2017; Hanquinet et al., 
2012; Ljunggren & Andersen, 2015; Préteceille, 2007; Savage et al., 2015a, 2018). These 
studies used different conceptions and operationalizations of class (e.g. occupation or a 
multidimensional measure), whereby only some studies examine the complete urban 
structure (e.g. Savage et al., 2015a) while other studies focus on issues such as elite 
formation (e.g. Cunningham & Savage, 2015). Moreover, the role of cultural capital has 
been relatively neglected in research on class and the changing urban structure, an issue 
we will further address in this study.
A related aim of this study is to link social class research to literature on the socio-
economic structure of urban areas. The latter mainly centers on the debate whether cities 
have become more polarized (Sassen, 1991) or professionalized (Butler et al., 2008; 
Hamnett, 1994) and the spatial implications of this (Musterd et al., 2017). We seek to 
enrich this literature by showing that polarization and professionalization take on some-
what different meanings when social class is considered (cf. Pratschke & Morlicchio, 
2012).
One reason why few studies on urban structures have explored issues of social class is 
the lack of appropriate data. Occupational class is the most common indicator of class 
and is often operationalized using class schemes with broad class categories (see Lambert 
& Bihagen, 2014). These broad occupational categories are, however, limited in predict-
ing cultural preferences (see Savage et al., 2013) and do not adequately capture precarious 
forms of employment or underemployment, such as people working on part-time and 
zero hours contracts (Payne, 2013). Our dataset offers a unique opportunity to overcome 
some of these limitations. We use two waves, 2008 and 2017, from the Rotterdam 
Neighborhood Profile survey to examine the city’s class structure and how it changed 
in this period. The survey contains 10,686 and 15,215 respondents per wave and is 
representative at the neighborhood level, thus making comparisons at this level feasible.
This study aims to address three questions concerning social class in Rotterdam. First, 
what does the class structure look like when we conceive of class as the possession of 
economic, social, and cultural capital? Second, how did this class structure change 
between 2008 and 2017? And finally, what are the spatial manifestations of this class 
structure and how did they change during this period? In the theoretical framework we 
explicate Bourdieu’s theory of social class and how it has been used to establish class 
structures. We argue that this conception of class may advance the professionalization- 
polarization debate. Next, we discuss developments in socio-spatial divisions and how 
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they relate to the geography of class. These insights are then compared to our case in this 
study, i.e. Rotterdam. The subsequent section describes our data and method and there-
after, the results of the latent class analysis and spatial analysis are presented. In the final 
section, we provide explanations of our findings and discuss the implications and 
limitations of this study.
Theoretical background
The relevance of a multidimensional conception of social class for the 
professionalization-polarization debate
The definition and relevance of social class have been extensively debated throughout the 
history of sociology. Recent contributions argue that in the past twenty years social class 
analysis has experienced (yet) another revival (e.g. Savage et al., 2015a). This reemergence 
of class analysis can largely be attributed to the development of cultural class analysis, a 
field of research that considers cultural aspects, such as identities and lifestyle practices, 
pivotal for class analysis – next to the traditional emphasis on the economic nature of 
social class (Devine & Savage, 2005; Flemmen, 2013; Savage, Warde et al., 2005). Cultural 
class analysis strongly relies on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu and adopts several of his 
key concepts such as “capital”, “habitus”, and “field” (Bennett et al., 2009). This field of 
research deviates from traditional accounts of social class, which view employment 
relations (Goldthorpe, 2000) or the social relations of production (Wright, 1985) as 
being central to class analysis (see Crompton, 2008).
Bourdieu (1984, 1985, 1987) viewed social classes as positions that agents can occupy 
in the “social space”, where this position is determined by the volume and composition of 
capital. “Capital” is accumulated labor in the widest sense and thus varies both in volume 
and composition. Volume refers to the possession of a certain amount of capital and 
composition concerns the different types of capital. Generally, three types of capital are 
distinguished: economic capital (wealth and income), social capital (contacts and con-
nections which allow people to draw on their social networks), and cultural capital (the 
ability to appreciate and engage with cultural goods, and credentials institutionalized 
through educational success) (Savage et al., 2013, p. 223; see also Bourdieu, 1986).1 
Capital works in different ways in various fields and has varying potential for accumula-
tion and convertibility (Savage, Warde et al., 2005, p. 40).
Bourdieu introduced the idea of “social space” to locate agents in the class structure, 
which is heuristically presented by having capital volume on a vertical axis and capital 
composition on a horizontal axis (see Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 128–129). In this scheme 
economic and cultural capital are the main ordering principles of both capital composi-
tion and volume, as their relative weight and possession determine the potential for 
domination in certain fields. The kinds of capital, like the aces in a game of cards, are 
powers that define the chances of profit in a given field (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 724). An 
agent’s position in the social space thus signifies to what extent one may dominate 
another agent who occupies an opposite position in this space, depending on how the 
capital properties can confer strength, power and profit on their holder. The social space 
should thereby be viewed as continuous without any clear-cut boundaries between class 
positions (Bourdieu, 1987).
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Many researchers have used this model of the social space to study the class structure 
in different contexts (e.g. Flemmen et al., 2019). Others have diverged from Bourdieu’s 
model of social space, which is methodologically based on multiple correspondence 
analysis, to determine the class structure (Custers & Engbersen, 2020; Savage et al., 
2013; Waitkus & Groh-Samberg, 2019). Instead of mapping class positions onto a two- 
dimensional space, these studies developed class typologies to identify and accentuate 
certain divisions within the class hierarchy. In this way the volume and composition of 
capital – i.e. people’s capital portfolios – can be more easily quantified, which potentially 
provides more insight into class-specific strategies (Waitkus & Groh-Samberg, 2019). 
Savage et al. (2013) exemplify how typologies can illuminate capital portfolios by show-
ing that classes can strongly differ from each other – the elite versus the precariat – while 
also providing insight into class fragmentations in the middle segment. Typologies may 
therefore reveal certain “ideal type” classes (in the Weberian sense) that would remain 
invisible when continuous scales of stratification are used (cf. Flemmen, 2013; Hagenaars 
& Halman, 1989).
These class typologies, which are constructed using latent class analysis, have been 
criticized in general for their limited predictive power (e.g. Mills, 2014) and for excluding 
questions of “power” and “domination” in class analysis (e.g. Skeggs, 2015). Ideally, class 
typologies should therefore not only provide a model of the class structure that is 
theoretically plausible, but also clarify the nature of class relations (Bradley, 2014). In 
our analysis we therefore delineate how class relations become manifest through chan-
ging spatial divisions.
Bourdieu’s view on social class adds a valuable perspective to the field of urban studies 
in which quantitative studies generally rely on the notion of “socioeconomic status” 
(Hanquinet et al., 2012; Ljunggren & Andersen, 2015; Van Gent et al., 2019). 
Socioeconomic status tends to fuse economic, cultural and social elements, and is 
frequently used in the form of some hierarchical scale that is insensitive to the multi-
layered nature of stratification (Flemmen et al., 2019). Using social class as a multi-
dimensional concept – i.e. capital portfolios – gives us a better grasp of the nature of 
stratification as economic, cultural, and social aspects are treated as separate elements. 
Social class can therefore enhance the professionalization-polarization debate as studies 
in this field differ greatly in their indicators of socioeconomic status. When discussing 
processes of professionalization or polarization indicators such as income, employment 
and education are used interchangeably, which creates ambiguity as to how the urban 
structure is actually developing (Hamnett, 2001; Nørgaard, 2003; Pratschke & 
Morlicchio, 2012).
The topic of polarization and professionalization has been the subject of a long-
standing debate in urban literature about whether large cities have become more polar-
ized (Sassen, 1991) or professionalized (Butler et al., 2008; Hamnett, 1994). Polarization 
refers to a process whereby global economic restructuring creates high-end jobs in 
business sectors such as finance, accountancy and ICT, which in turn leads to an increase 
in jobs at the lower end of the urban labor market (e.g. cleaning or food service 
industries) (Sassen, 1991). Accordingly, the number of jobs in the middle segment of 
the urban labor market declines at a relative rate, thus creating an overall polarized 
structure (cf. Goos et al., 2014). Professionalization, on the other hand, entails the 
continuous upgrading of the labor market structure. Since the majority of jobs in post- 
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industrial labor markets require a higher level of professional skills through education, 
lower-end jobs are gradually replaced by middle-class jobs. The implication is that the 
urban structure does not become polarized, but more middle class instead (Hamnett, 
1994).
It is difficult to generalize about which of these processes is more dominant. As 
mentioned above, the choice of indicators matters. Although the professionalization- 
polarization debate initially revolved around the occupational structure, academics also 
started to use other social indicators such as income and education (Nørgaard, 2003; 
Pratschke & Morlicchio, 2012). The 2008–9 recession also drew attention to the growing 
wealth inequality in recent decades, as the relative share of wealth has grown among the 
upper classes (e.g. Piketty, 2014; Savage et al., 2015a). The urban literature shows how 
processes of socioeconomic transformation are contingent on several factors, such as 
welfare state arrangements, housing policies, variation in the structure of local econo-
mies, forms of gentrification, demographic changes, and migration (e.g. Burgers & 
Musterd, 2002; Lees et al., 2008; Van der Waal, 2010; Van Kempen & Marcuse, 1997; 
Van Kempen & Murie, 2009). Thus, the type of social indicator and local context are 
pivotal in assessing processes of polarization and professionalization.
The relationship between these two processes on the one hand and social class on the 
other is complicated because from a Bourdieusian perspective, no clear hierarchy exists, 
especially in the middle segment of the class structure (Crompton, 2008; Savage et al., 
2015a, 2013). Theoretically, if the share of classes with a very high capital volume (elite) 
and a very low capital volume (precariat) increases, we could speak of class polarization. 
On the other hand, if classes with very low volumes of capital decline whilst the share of 
various middle classes simultaneously increases, then this change could be called pro-
fessionalization. Yet if we follow the model by Savage et al. (2013), some possible changes 
in the class structure might be difficult to characterize as either polarization or profes-
sionalization. For example, if the “technical middle class”, a middle class with relatively 
high economic capital but low social capital, were to increase at the expense of the “new 
affluent workers”, who are higher on social capital but lower on economic capital, we 
would have a class upgrade from an economic capital perspective but a downgrade in 
terms of social capital – assuming that other class shares remain equal.
Geographies of social class
The spatial consequences of socioeconomic transformation in urban areas have been 
extensively researched (e.g. Andersson & Hedman, 2016; Hochstenbach & Musterd, 
2018; Hochstenbach & Van Gent, 2015; Maloutas, 2007). What can generally be deduced 
from studies on socio-spatial divisions is that, for the past two decades, socioeconomic 
segregation has been on the rise in both Europe and the US (Bischoff & Reardon, 2013; 
Musterd et al., 2017), although the local context remains decisive (Maloutas, 2007).2 The 
2008–9 recession is likely to have exacerbated economic inequalities and segregation 
within urban areas (Andersson & Hedman, 2016; Zwiers et al., 2016). Higher socio-
economic groups have become more concentrated in affluent neighborhoods and vice 
versa. Empirically, segregation by affluence is a particularly prevailing process (see also 
Atkinson & Flint, 2004). That is, the rich are increasingly segregated compared to other 
socioeconomic groups.
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Although related, research on the geography of class demonstrates how patterns of 
class residence do not necessarily follow established patterns of socioeconomic disper-
sion (e.g. based on income) (e.g. Hanquinet et al., 2012; Van Gent et al., 2019). This 
literature mainly focuses on the different spatial orientations of middle-class fractions, 
whereby occupation is the most widely used indicator of social class. A general finding is 
that the “cultural” middle class (e.g. journalists, academics, architects) tends to have a 
stronger urban orientation than other middle classes (Boterman & Musterd, 2017; 
Boterman et al., 2018; Ley, 2003; Ljunggren & Andersen, 2015; Préteceille, 2007). 
Cultural capital, particularly a preference for the urban esthetic, serves as an important 
explanation for this pattern, as is the proximity to cultural amenities such as museums 
and theaters (Bridge, 2006; Butler & Robson, 2001; Savage et al., 2018). The role of 
cultural capital is further highlighted by Cunningham and Savage (2017), who show that 
occupational groups living further from the center of London possess less cultural capital 
on average than their counterparts living closer to the center. Geographies of social class 
can, however, strongly vary between urban contexts. As Bacqué et al. (2015) argue, the 
middle-class geographies of Paris and London are very distinct as a result of the infra-
structure (public transport), physical aspects (historical development), symbolic places, 
and the role of the state in both cities. Furthermore, research on middle-class geographies 
is often closely linked to gentrification (see Lees et al., 2008), referring to the process 
where middle classes move into formerly working-class neighborhoods at the cost of the 
original residents.
Next to the focus on middle-class geographies, attention has also been paid to the 
relation between “elites” and space (e.g. Burrows et al., 2017; Cunningham, 2019; 
Cunningham & Savage, 2017; Toft, 2018). This research generally shows that individuals 
who possess a high amount of capital – economic, cultural, and social – occupy exclusive 
spaces in global cities that segregate them from other classes. The process by which these 
elites create exclusive spaces is known as “super-gentrification” (Butler & Lees, 2006). 
Middle and elite classes thus have distinct geographies, depending on the urban context 
and class fractions. The implication is that class segregation and geography, especially 
from a cultural perspective, are more complex than socioeconomic segregation, which 
underlines the need for more differentiated geographies that can shed light on contem-
porary urban inequalities (cf. Davidson & Wyly, 2012; Hamnett & Butler, 2013).
The case of Rotterdam
In this paper we investigate how these insights about the urban structure and spatial 
divisions apply to the Rotterdam context. Rotterdam is the second city in the Netherlands 
(over 630,000 inhabitants) and has a highly mixed population in ethnic and social terms 
(Engbersen et al., 2019). The city is usually characterized as a harbor city that is struggling 
with its transition into a modern service economy (Burgers & Musterd, 2002) and coping 
with a negative reputation of being the poorest, most unsafe and most “colored” (Van 
Eijk, 2010). Yet, we observe that this narrative about Rotterdam is changing. These days 
Rotterdam is generally considered as an attractive place to live and visit. A large increase 
in housing prices, particularly in and around the city center, reflect the city’s increasing 
popularity. Between 2015 and 2018 the average market price of owner-occupied houses 
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in Rotterdam rose by 39%, compared to the national average of 23% (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2019).
Rotterdam has undergone several sociodemographic and labor market changes in the 
past few decades. Three structural trends characterize these changes: increasing flexibi-
lization, occupational polarization, and a rising level of education (De Graaf, 2018; Van 
der Aa et al., 2018). Both temporal employment and self-employment increased by 15% 
and 38% respectively: combined they mainly account for the total growth in jobs between 
2009 and 2016. Furthermore, the largest increase in jobs was on the highest level – 
professional occupations involving highly complex tasks – and a smaller increase was on 
the bottom level – elementary and routine occupations involving simple tasks. The 
number of jobs in the middle segment declined – semi-routine and intermediate occupa-
tions – indicating that the occupational structure polarized during the past decade (see 
Van der Aa et al., 2018). The final trend, educational upgrading, is also marked: whereas 
in 2008 respectively 43% was low educated and 21% was highly educated, in 2017 34% 
was low educated and 27% was highly educated (De Graaf, 2018). These trends reveal a 
peculiar pattern. Even though the population of Rotterdam has become more highly 
educated and has been upgraded in occupational terms, forms of precarious work are also 
on the rise (i.e. temporal employment and self-employment). Rotterdam has also become 
more ethnically diverse. The percentage of people with a migration background rose 
from 40% in 2000 to more than 50% in 2017 (Scholten et al., 2019). Among the new 
migrants arriving in Rotterdam, a substantial share can be classified as knowledge 
workers (see Engbersen et al., 2019).
The spatial lay-out of Rotterdam is in the first place characterized by the socio-spatial 
division between the “poor” South part below the New Meuse river and the more affluent 
part above the river where the city center lies. Adjacent to the city center there are several 
traditional working-class neighborhoods with a relatively large pre-war housing stock. 
These central neighborhoods have undergone gentrification in the past decades 
(Hochstenbach & Van Gent, 2015). The outer neighborhoods of the city are generally 
residential areas that constitute a mix of lower and middle classes. Hochstenbach and 
Musterd (2019) show that between 2005 and 2015 the share of low-income households 
decreased in several central neighborhoods and increased in the outer neighborhoods, 
which signifies a gradual decentralization of low-income households.
Rotterdam is further known as a “unique” or “extreme” case in urban research because 
during the past 20–30 years it has been a site of political contestation where policies on 
social exclusion, immigrant integration, safety, “social mix” and gentrification have 
become highly intertwined (Doucet et al., 2011; Scholten et al., 2019; Uitermark & 
Duyvendak, 2008; Uitermark et al., 2007; Van Eijk, 2010; Van Gent et al., 2018). This 
particular policy mix can mainly be traced back to the sudden rise of right-wing populist 
politics in Rotterdam in 2002, which preceded the establishment of right-wing populism 
at the national level (see Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). Since then the general tendency 
amongst different coalitions in Rotterdam has been that “problem neighborhoods” with 
“opportunity-poor” residents need to be transformed into “clean, safe, and whole” – i.e. 
livable – neighborhoods in which “opportunity-rich” residents contribute to a better 
living environment. One of these policies is the Rotterdam Act (Van der Laan Bouma- 
Doff, 2007; Van Gent et al., 2018). This act prohibits unemployed households from 
moving into certain deprived areas that are mainly located on the south side of the New 
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Meuse river. The policy theory is that livability in these areas will increase when a further 
influx of unemployed and poor residents is prevented. Whereas the Rotterdam Act 
prevents certain groups from moving into designated areas, gentrification and social 
mixing are also actively promoted by the municipality (Doucet et al., 2011; Uitermark et 
al., 2007). Thus, the municipality clearly favors the residence of higher socioeconomic 
groups over that of lower socioeconomic groups.
In sum, the social and socio-spatial structure of Rotterdam have significantly changed 
over the past two decades. Combining the literature on social classes and spatial divisions 
with more specific insights about Rotterdam, we expect three changes to have occurred:
1. The share of middle classes increased between 2008 and 2017. Considering the 
substantial rise in educational level in Rotterdam, it is likely that the share of middle 
classes with high cultural capital in particular has increased.
2. The increases in forms of precarious employment might also lead to some growth at 
the bottom of the class structure.
3. Classes with higher economic capital increased in central neighborhoods and classes 
with lower economic capital increased in outer neighborhoods.
Data and method
We use two waves from the Rotterdam Neighborhood Profile survey to investigate the 
class structure and differences in class sizes between 2008 and 2017. This biennial cross- 
sectional survey, which covers all 71 administrative neighborhoods and is designed to be 
representative on neighborhood level, is an instrument to monitor the “social and 
physical state” of the city (see Municipality of Rotterdam, 2019). Respondents were 
selected according to a stratified random sampling method in which neighborhoods 
were the grouping level. In addition, ethnic minorities such as Turks and Moroccans 
were oversampled to obtain a representative sample. The response rates for 2008 and 
2017 were 24% and 21% respectively.3 Our analysis includes the adult population, i.e. 
people aged 18 and above. After data reduction, the 2008 sample included 10,686 
respondents (2.2% missing values were deleted) and the 2017 sample included 15,215 
respondents (3.4% missing values were deleted).
Owing to the sample’s skewed distribution with respect to multiple sociodemographic 
characteristics, weights were developed based on population data obtained from the 
municipality’s research department. The weights account for sample skews regarding 
age, gender, household type, education, and ethnicity. The development of the weights is 
discussed in the Online Appendix. The weights are applied in both the latent class 
analysis and subsequent descriptive and spatial analyses.
Economic capital
Two measures reflect the economic capital of respondents. First, household income 
measures the self-reported monthly net income of a respondent’s household, excluding 
any additional benefits such as healthcare, rent, or child and holiday allowances. Five 
answer categories were recoded to four levels: minimum (up to € 950 for single-adult 
households, up to € 1,300 for dual-adult households); minimum to modal (between € 950 
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– € 1,300 for single-adult households, between € 1,300 – € 1,700 for all households); 
modal to double modal (between € 1,700 – € 2,950); and more than double modal (€ 
2,950 or higher). The categories correspond to the 2008 national income distribution 
from which the levels of minimum and modal income were derived. In the 2017 survey, 
the price levels were adjusted for inflation. Since many respondents did not provide a 
valid answer (23.1% in 2008 and 23.3% in 2017), we imputed their scores using regression 
analysis with an added random residual.4 The following variables were used to predict 
household income: education level, hours worked, homeowner (yes/no), employed (yes/ 
no), age, age squared, self-rated health, autochthonous (yes/no), couple with kids (yes/ 
no), and respondents’ ability to “make ends meet”. The model predicted 57% of the 
variance in household income. The imputed scores were recoded to correspond to the 
original answer categories.
Second, to include a measure of wealth we used a data file from the municipality with 
estimations from the Real Estate Valuation Act. These conservative estimations reflect 
market values of dwellings and are used to determine the property tax. We were able to 
link respondents with this file on the pc6-level, the smallest postcode area in the 
Netherlands. A pc6-area includes about 50 addresses on average. We took the median 
house price in these pc6-areas. We further distinguish between homeowners and renters, 
since homeowners at least partially possess the capital reflected in the house price 
whereas renters do not. The variable property value consists of four categories: renter 
<125k; renter >125k; homeowner <200k; homeowner >200k.
Social capital
We use two measures to assess to what extent people receive social support and have ties 
with their friends and acquaintances. Social support is a variable based on four 5-point 
Likert items that measure various forms and feelings of support (or the lack thereof). The 
four items include statements about having someone to talk to about important issues; 
whether respondents felt abandoned; whether somebody expressed interest in the 
respondent; and whether respondents had difficulties receiving help from people close 
to them. Respondents needed three valid scores on this scale (Cronbach’s alpha 
2008 = .829; Cronbach’s alpha 2017 = .834), which was subsequently recoded into 
three categories: (totally) disagree; neutral; and (totally) agree.
Contact with friends is operationalized by asking respondents about their contact 
frequency with friends or well-known acquaintances. The question emphasized that it 
was about people from outside the respondents’ homes. The answer categories were 
recoded into at least once a week; at least once a month; or less than once a month. These 
two measures only partially correspond to Bourdieu’s notion of social capital. The 
theoretical and methodological implications are considered in the discussion section.
Cultural capital
We used two measures that account for distinct forms of cultural capital. First, education 
level is a common measure of cultural capital, reflecting its “institutionalized” state 
(Bourdieu, 1986).5 Respondents were asked about their obtained level of education, 
which was recoded into the following categories: primary or no education (low); junior 
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secondary vocational up to senior general secondary (middle); and higher professional or 
university (high).
Second, cultural visit measures various forms of mostly highbrow cultural capital. 
Respondents were asked how often they went to a movie or theater play, a concert, a 
cultural festival and/or a museum. The original six response categories were recoded into 
three categories: at least once a month; less than once a month; never. Although this 
measure covers a variety of practices, most of them include “higher forms” of culture. 
Going to the movies or visiting a concert are obviously more mainstream forms of 
cultural participation. Still, 31.1% of the respondents never engage in any of these 
practices and 34.8% less than once a month. This measure reflects a quite distinct, 
more “embodied” form of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). It also captures the general 
divide between those who “participate” and those who don’t, which is marked as the most 
important axis in cultural capital research (Bennett et al., 2009). Yet, some studies reason 
that the highbrow distinction has become less relevant, especially among younger 
cohorts, while other ways of distinction have gained prominence, such as “omnivorous-
ness” or “emerging cultural capital” (see Friedman et al., 2015). A limitation is that our 
survey does not include measures on these other forms of cultural capital.
Descriptive information about the variables can be found in Table 1.
Method and model selection
Latent class analysis (LCA) is a method to recover latent classes from observed catego-
rical variables. The basic idea is that distributions on these variables differ between 
unobserved groups (i.e. latent classes) and that these groups explain the association 
between the manifest variables (Magidson & Vermunt, 2004; Oberski, 2016). LCA builds 
on the assumption of conditional independence, meaning the manifest variables are 
assumed to be mutually independent in each latent class. In other words, within a latent 
class the correlation between variables should be zero. LCA is further probabilistic in 
nature. Membership of a certain class increases the probability of having a particular set 
of scores on the manifest variables, but this is not absolutely determined. In turn, the 
responses provided by respondents on the relevant variables determine their most likely 
class membership. LCA is an interesting method for social class analysis, because it can 
identify similar individuals who might possess much of a certain capital type but little of 
another (Waitkus & Groh-Samberg, 2019; cf. Hagenaars & Halman, 1989). This identi-
fication is especially useful in disentangling the middle classes, which are usually char-
acterized by robust levels of economic capital but heterogeneous in terms of social and 
cultural capital (Savage et al., 2015a).
The LCA was performed in Stata 16.0 using a plug-in developed by Lanza et al. (2018). 
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood using the expectation-maximiza-
tion (EM) algorithm. The iterative nature of the EM-algorithm makes it possible to 
estimate models with missing values on the manifest variables (10.4% of total sample). 
The missing values are replaced by estimated values, which are subsequently used to 
estimate the parameters. Further, the model can fit categorical variables. In order to reach 
a global instead of local maximum, the models were estimated 25 times with different 
starting values. The LCA was performed on the pooled dataset, combining the cross- 
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sectional surveys of 2008 and 2017. Respondents are assigned to their most likely class 
based on the highest posterior probability (Goodman, 2007).
As LCA is an exploratory method, choosing the best LCA model depends on several 
substantive and methodological choices. Different fit measures guide the decision on 
picking the best model, but there is no standard approach in this regard (Magidson & 
Vermunt, 2004; Nylund et al., 2007; Oberski, 2016; Tein et al., 2013). The Stata plug-in 
provides different information criteria (AIC, BIC, and adjusted BIC) and a classification 
criterion (entropy R2) that serve as indications of model fit. Table 2 shows these fit 
measures with a different number of classes. LCA literature indicates that choosing the 
model with the lowest BIC is the most widely used procedure (Oberski, 2016; Tein et al., 
2013), although with some categorical LCA models the adjusted BIC might be more 
appropriate (Nylund et al., 2007).6 Table 2 indicates that a model with seven classes has 
the lowest BIC, whereas a model with nine classes has the lowest adjusted BIC. The 
Table 1. Descriptive information on variables in the LCA (weighted proportions).
Variable 2008 2017 Total
Household income
% minimum or less 21.2 24.2 23.0
% minimum to modal 33.0 32.0 32.4
% modal to double modal 27.3 25.0 25.9
% more than double modal 18.5 18.8 18.7
Property value
% renter <125k 30.1 32.9 31.7
% renter >125k 29.4 22.9 25.7
% homeowner <200k 23.8 30.5 27.7
% homeowner >200k 16.7 13.7 15.0
Social support
% (totally) disagree 6.8 9.9 8.6
% neutral 20.5 24.0 22.5
% (totally) agree 72.8 66.2 68.9
Contact with friends
% less than once a month 5.4 8.2 7.1
% at least once a month 16.5 17.0 16.8
% at least once a week 78.1 74.7 76.1
Education level
% low 43.0 34.0 37.4
% middle 36.0 39.0 37.7
% high 21.0 27.0 24.8
Cultural visit
% never 42.0 23.8 31.3
% less than once a month 31.1 37.4 34.8
% at least once a month 26.9 38.8 33.9
N 10,686 15,215 25,901
Table 2. Fit measures of different LCA models (pooled dataset).
Model Resid. df Entropy R2 Adjusted BIC BIC AIC Log-likelihood (pseudo)
4 classes 1,236 0.603 3,341.9 3,529.4 3,047.9 −152,406.3
5 classes 1,221 0.610 2,989.6 3,224.8 2,620.8 −152,177.8
6 classes 1,206 0.581 2,678.8 2,961.7 2,235.3 −151,970.0
7 classes 1,191 0.584 2,566.9 2,897.4 2,048.5 −151,861.6
8 classes 1,176 0.565 2,554.4 2,932.5 1,961.3 −151,803.0
9 classes 1,161 0.569 2,541.1 2,967.0 1,873.3 −151,744.0
10 classes 1,146 0.563 2,553.2 3,026.7 1,810.5 −151,697.6
log-likelihood is a pseudo-function because weights were used 
N = 25,901
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entropy R2, a measure of uncertainty classification (see Tein et al., 2013), is slightly 
higher for the seven-class model compared to the nine-class model. Based on the relevant 
statistical criteria, a seven-class or nine-class model might thus be preferred. Another 
relevant criterion, however, is substantive interpretation, i.e. which model makes sense 
from a theoretical perspective (Oberski, 2016). In our interpretation, the model with nine 
classes does not provide any additional insights with respect to the theoretical plausibility 
of the class structure while the seven-class model offers a more elegant and parsimonious 
solution. Hence, we present findings from the model with seven classes, also because 
these classes resonate with earlier studies on social class that examined different class 
fractions.
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6.1 5.6 3.5 4.2 4.3 2.4 2.5 4.0
Cultural visit 
(1–3)
2.5 2.8 1.9 1.8 2.7 1.3 1.3 2.1
all values indicate mean scores (except % homeowner). Range of variables is shown between brackets. 
1The original variable is used here to better indicate the variation across classes. 
N = 25,901















Mean age 46 40 48 51 41 54 52 47
Median age 43 37 47 51 37 57 53 45
% female 44 48 50 40 55 57 54 51




1 3 4 6 14 16 32 11
% retired 10 7 17 22 13 33 26 18
% dual-adult HH 87 59 75 71 39 53 45 59
% 1-adult/1- 
parent HH
13 41 25 29 61 47 55 41
% migration 
background1
28 41 36 39 57 52 61 46
1Persons who are born abroad or have at least one parent born abroad. 
N = 25,901
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In addition, we performed several analyses to test the validity and robustness of our 
seven-class solution.7 These robustness checks included separate analyses on the 2008 
and 2017 samples, analyses that examined potential biases in the results due to the 
missing values on the income variable and analyses that considered the influence of the 
sample size. Overall, our seven-class solution seems robust. An elaboration of these 
robustness checks can be found in the Online Appendix.
Results
A class typology
Table 3 indicates how each class scores on the variables used in the LCA. Thus, for each 
class this table presents the volume and composition of capital that they possess on 
average. In addition, Table 4 shows the sociodemographic profile of each class and Table 
5 includes the weighted proportions of all classes in the sample. We use these tables to 
describe the seven classes. We labeled the classes according to the characteristics that best 
typify each class.
The class with the highest volume of capital is the established upper class (11.8% of the 
sample). Almost all respondents in this class have a double modal household income or 
more and the property value of their dwellings is almost twice the city’s average. The 
established upper class also has very high levels of social and cultural capital. For 
instance, the average education level is a professional degree. Most respondents in this 
class work fulltime (84% employed in total), live in a household with two adults (87%) 
and are autochthonous (72%). The established upper class clearly has an “elite”-like 
status, especially due to its high level of economic capital, which sets it apart from the 
middle classes (cf. Piketty, 2014; Savage et al., 2015a).8
The cultural middle class (15.6%) is a relatively young class and has a high household 
income on average, but its property value is lower than the city’s average (57% owns a 
house). Although its educational level is slightly lower, the cultural middle class has levels 
of social and cultural capital that are similar to the established upper class. Next to its 
young age (mean: 40), this class includes many employed respondents (82%) and 
relatively many one-adult households (41%) in comparison to the other middle classes 
with high economic capital. Taking things together, this class seems to mainly represent 
Table 5. Class change between 2008 and 2017.
2008 2017
Population (estimated) % Population (estimated) % % total
Established upper class 52,975 11.8 58,061 11.8 11.8
Cultural middle class 57,396 12.8 86,146 17.5 15.6
Traditional middle class 91,126 20.3 78,483 16.0 17.7
Contact-poor middle class 21,560 4.8 27,572 5.6 5.3
Emergent middle class 70,787 15.7 107,562 21.9 19.3
Lower class 103,044 22.9 65,403 13.3 17.2
Precariat 53,101 11.8 68,609 13.9 13.1
Total 449,989 100 491,835 100 100
N (survey) 10,686 15,215 25,901
Population numbers are based on percentage share in the sample and total population aged 18 + . The class shares are 
statistically different from each other in 2008 and 2017 (p < .05, two-sided tests; pairwise comparisons within a row are 
adjusted using the Bonferroni correction), except for the established upper class.
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the more prosperous urban professionals who likely comprise a mix of occupational 
groupings – technical, public, and service sector – and household compositions (cf. 
Boterman & Musterd, 2017; Butler & Robson, 2001).
The traditional middle class (17.7%) has a household income and property value above 
the city’s average, and 86% is homeowner. Its level of social capital is also above average, 
but its cultural capital is lower compared to the other middle classes. The average level of 
education is senior vocational and cultural visits are made less than once a month. In 
general, this class is in their late-forties and most members are either employed (64%) or 
retired (17%) and a majority of households include two adults (75%). Hence, people in 
this class are likely to be older workers with intermediate occupations. Some studies 
argue their position is increasingly vulnerable (see Engbersen et al., 2018; Goos et al., 
2014), though their level of economic capital is rather high here.
The next middle class is the contact-poor middle class (5.3%). This class has a modal to 
double modal income on average and the majority owns a house (61%). As the name 
indicates, the contact-poor middle class is mainly characterized by its relatively low level 
of social capital. The level of social support is below average and the score on contact 
frequency indicates they only speak to friends and acquaintances a few times a month. 
Their level of education is slightly above average, but their cultural visit is just below 
average. Furthermore, this class reveals the gendered nature of class differences as 60% is 
male. In addition, most respondents are employed (62%) and live in a dual-adult house-
hold (71%). The contact-poor middle class shows that even middle classes who possess 
considerable economic capital can still lack a substantial amount of social capital. Due to 
its low level of social capital, this class resembles the technical middle class identified by 
Savage et al. (2013).
An interesting class that results from the LCA is the emergent middle class (19.3%). 
This young class is low on economic capital, but fairly high on social and cultural capital. 
It has a high contact frequency with friends and acquaintances and the level of social 
support is more or less average. In addition, it goes on a cultural visit multiple times per 
month and its education level is around senior general secondary. A large proportion of 
this class is around their thirties (median: 37) and many members are employed (49%) or 
a student (17%, not reported in Table 4). Furthermore, one-adult households are over-
represented (61%) as are respondents with a migration background (57%). These indi-
cators suggest that we are dealing with a class in which many people are likely to be 
socially mobile later on in their life course, especially considering their combination of 
capital types. We therefore labeled this class both “middle” and “emergent”, even though 
in economic terms it is hardly a middle class. The emergent middle class is comparable to 
the “emergent service worker” in Savage et al. (2013).
The lower class (17.2%) is clearly defined by its low level of economic capital. Its 
household income is close to the minimum and only four percent owns a house. Yet, its 
social capital is high. The level of social support is high and the contact frequency with 
friends and acquaintances is almost on a weekly basis. The lower class possesses little 
cultural capital; its education level is around junior vocational. Again, the gendered 
nature of class is visible here, since 57% of this class is female. It is also older on average 
(54) and includes many retirees (33%), one-adult households (47%) and respondents 
with a migration background (52%). What is interesting about this class is that despite 
their low levels of economic and cultural capital, they still have considerable social capital 
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to rely on. Similar profiles of this class can be found in studies on cohesive working-class 
(migrant) communities (e.g. Gans, 1982; Young & Willmott, 1986).
The final class is the precariat (13.1%). This class resembles the lower class in its low 
levels of economic and cultural capital, but has very little social capital as well. In general, 
it receives limited social support and the contact frequency with friends and acquain-
tances is around once a month or less. The precariat has a similar demographic profile as 
the lower class, though the share of unemployed is higher (32%). This class can thus be 
considered the most vulnerable class, since it has a very low volume of capital (cf. 
Standing, 2011; Wacquant & Wilson, 1989).
Changes in class structure and geography
One of the central questions in this paper is how this class structure changed between 
2008 and 2017. Table 5 shows some substantial differences in class shares between 2008 
and 2017. The cultural middle class and emergent middle class both increased in size by 
4.7% and 6.2% respectively. On the other hand, the traditional middle class and the lower 
class both clearly diminished; the former by 4.3% and the latter by 9.6%. The shares of the 
other classes remained more or less stable, although the precariat grew by 2.1%.
These results demonstrate that class change is not simply a process whereby the 
middle class grows at the expense of the working class (professionalization) or whereby 
the middle class slowly disappears (polarization), since specific changes take place within 
the class structure. The main finding from our model is that two large classes with 
relatively little cultural capital, the traditional middle class and lower class, were smaller 
in 2017 than in 2008 while two other classes with a high level of cultural capital, i.e. the 
cultural middle class and emergent middle class, grew during this period. Looking at 
economic and social capital, the cultural middle class resembles the traditional middle 
class – the wealth of the latter is somewhat higher – and the same applies to the emergent 
middle class and lower class. Hence, what our model principally shows is that cultural 
capital is the main factor underlying class differences in Rotterdam between 2008 and 
2017. In a way the class structure became more “middle class” because the lower class in 
particular decreased in size. Therefore, professionalization seems the dominant process, 
but at the same time our model shows that class differences over time are more complex 
than can be captured by the concepts of professionalization and polarization (see also 
discussion). These findings are in line with our expectation that the middle classes with 
high cultural capital increased the most in Rotterdam. The expectation that there would 
also be growth at the bottom of the class structure does find some support here when we 
only consider the precariat.
Another central question is how this class structure relates to spatial divisions. That is, 
are spatial patterns distinct for every class and how have these changed during the 
economic recession? We focus on spatial differences in class concentrations rather than 
on segregation. Our main goal here is to examine class differences between 2008 and 2017 
from a spatial perspective. We selected three classes to illustrate that most classes exhibit 
a distinct spatial pattern. These include the established upper class, the traditional middle 
class and the emergent middle class. We demonstrate how these classes were dispersed 
across the city in 2008 and how this dispersion differed between 2008 and 2017.9
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Figure 1(a) shows that in 2008 the established upper class was strongly concentrated in 
a few neighborhoods in the east and northern part of the city. Since some of these 
neighborhoods are known as “traditional” elite neighborhoods, it is no surprise that we 
find strong concentrations here of the established upper class. Figure 1(b) reveals that 
between 2008 and 2017 the share of established upper class mainly increased in the city 
center and on the south banks of the New Meuse river. This shift is likely a result of how 
these areas have been transformed in the past decade. Multiple residential skyscrapers 
were built here in the past decade, aimed at attracting affluent groups like the established 
upper class (cf. Doucet et al., 2011).
The traditional middle class predominantly lives in the outer neighborhoods of 
Rotterdam, which are mostly residential areas (Figure 2(a)). Their relatively low level 
of cultural capital might explain this pattern, since most provisions preferred by people 
with high cultural capital (e.g. museums and theaters) are located in and around the city 
center. The traditional middle class might on the other hand prefer the space and 
residential atmosphere that is associated with the outer neighborhoods of Rotterdam 
(cf. Boterman et al., 2018; Custers & Engbersen, 2020). Their concentration in the south- 
west part of the city might follow from the proximity to the harbor. The harbor provides 
many well-paid jobs for the low and middle educated because of the labor intensiveness 
of these jobs. The traditional middle class fits this profile quite well. Figure 2(b) confirms 
that the traditional middle class has decreased overall, since we observe a negative 
difference in many neighborhoods. The decline in the south-west is particularly sub-
stantial, indicating that this area has changed quite rapidly (cf. Uitermark et al., 2007).
Figure 1a. (a) Established upper class in Rotterdam, 2008.
16 G. CUSTERS AND G. ENGBERSEN
The emergent middle class predominantly lives in the city center and the adjacent 
neighborhoods in the west, north, and east (Figure 3(a)). As with the traditional middle 
Figure 1b. Change in the established upper class in Rotterdam, 2008-2017
Figure 2a. (a) Traditional middle class in Rotterdam, 2008.
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class, their location might also be explained in terms of cultural capital. These areas are 
popular among adolescents since they are located close to cultural provisions and other 
amenities. However, Figure 3(b) shows that the emergent middle class has become more 
spread across the city. One possible explanation is that housing is generally more 
accessible in other parts of the city (cf. Hochstenbach & Musterd, 2019). The changing 
spatial patterns of the established upper class and emergent middle class partly confirm 
our expectation that classes with higher economic capital have become more dominant in 
the city center. This spatial difference between 2008 and 2017 is, however, equivocal to 
some extent.
Conclusion and discussion
This study set out to scrutinize three issues:
1. The class structure of Rotterdam when social class is conceptualized as the posses-
sion of economic, social, and cultural capital,
2. Changes in this class structure between 2008 and 2017, and
3. The spatial manifestations of this class structure and changes in spatial divisions in 
this period.
Figure 2b. (b) Change in the traditional middle class in Rotterdam, 2008–2017.
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Figure 3a. (a) Emergent middle class in Rotterdam, 2008.
Figure 3b. (b) Change in the emergent middle class in Rotterdam, 2008–2017.
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In addition, our goal was to link these issues to wider theoretical debates on the changing 
urban structure.
We established an elaborate class structure with one upper class, four middle classes, 
and two lower classes (cf. Savage et al., 2013; Waitkus & Groh-Samberg, 2019). Our class 
typology demonstrates the heterogeneous and fragmented nature of the class structure, in 
particular within the middle segment. In addition, we found that between 2008 and 2017 
multiple changes took place within the class structure. The overall change is that the 
lower class and traditional middle class were partially replaced by the emergent middle 
class and cultural middle class. When we interpret these changes in the class structure in 
terms of polarization and professionalization, we assert that professionalization seems to 
be the dominant process.
However, this shift is understood in terms of cultural capital, because the middle 
classes with high cultural capital increased at the expense of the lower and middle classes 
with low cultural capital. This assertion illustrates that with our multidimensional class 
structure the concepts of polarization and professionalization become somewhat ambig-
uous since no clear class hierarchy exists. For instance, the traditional middle class has a 
better economic position than the emergent middle class, but the latter possesses more 
cultural capital. The way in which one class is more advantaged than the other depends 
on context, i.e. in which “field” a certain capital offers advantage (Bourdieu, 1984). When 
one class is gradually replaced by another, one should therefore scrutinize what kind of 
professionalization or polarization this shift implies, not in the least because polarization 
and professionalization usually refer to change in one social dimension. A continued 
emphasis on precision is thus important in studying changes in urban structure 
(Hamnett, 2001; Nørgaard, 2003; Pratschke & Morlicchio, 2012).
Our spatial analysis further reveals that several classes are dispersed in specific ways 
and that spatial divisions changed between 2008 and 2017. We observe that the estab-
lished upper class became more concentrated in and adjacent to the city center, that the 
traditional middle class decreased in most neighborhoods, and that the emergent middle 
class mainly increased in neighborhoods outside the city center. In general, we find that 
middle classes with more cultural capital tend to live closer to the city center (e.g. 
Boterman et al., 2018; Cunningham & Savage, 2017; Hanquinet et al., 2012).
We offer two explanations for these findings on the class structure and spatial 
divisions and discuss their social and political implications as well. One explanation is 
that we see the effects of Rotterdam policies aimed at attracting the middle and upper 
classes to the city. These policies are mainly related to housing, such as reducing the 
social housing stock (Hochstenbach & Musterd, 2018) and excluding unemployed house-
holds from certain areas (Van Gent et al., 2018). The decline of the lower class can be 
understood through some of these policies, since this class predominantly lives in rental 
dwellings. On the other hand, the move of the established upper class to the city center 
might be due to the transformation of the waterfront areas on the North and South side 
of the New Meuse river. In the past two decades these locations have evolved as 
residential areas including residential towers containing high-end apartments (cf. 
Doucet et al., 2011).10 This development might reduce the emergent middle class’s access 
to the inner city, as it has become too expensive to live here. Thus, the relations between 
classes are made manifest through these spatial changes as one class move is associated 
with another.
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The findings implicate that issues of accessibility and affordability have become more 
pertinent since less living space remains for classes with low economic capital. Not only 
can rising housing prices push lower classes to the periphery or restrict access to the city 
(Hochstenbach & Musterd, 2018), they can also exacerbate existing inequalities within 
Rotterdam (Hochstenbach & Van Gent, 2015). The “poor” South part has relatively few 
houses that match the esthetic preferences of the established upper class and cultural 
middle class (cf. Bridge, 2006; Ley, 2003) and in addition, the stigma of “poverty” further 
lowers its attractiveness to the middle classes. Housing market pressure in the city center 
and adjacent neighborhoods is therefore likely to further increase, as space that is 
appealing to these classes, who are expected to become more dominant in the city, is 
limited (cf. Bacqué et al., 2015). Eventually this process could lead to a situation where 
some of these neighborhoods develop into segregated higher-class areas, although such 
places are rare in the Netherlands (Boterman et al., 2020).
A second explanation relates to broader labor market trends. In Rotterdam both the 
number of flexible jobs (temporal employment and self-employment) and the education 
level have increased in the past decade. These trends might explain the rise of the 
emergent middle class, a class with relatively high cultural capital but rather low 
economic capital due to their flexible jobs. Unfortunately, our data do not include 
detailed information about occupational status and employment contract to further 
examine the association between labor market change and our results. This issue 
indicates a general limitation of our study. We have little insight into the mechanisms 
that drive changes in the urban class structure and spatial divisions (Hochstenbach & 
Van Gent, 2015). We could not investigate to what extent social mobility, migration, 
gentrification, aging, the economic recession or other possible mechanisms played a role.
We conclude with some theoretical and methodological reflections. First, our 
approach in this paper deviates from Bourdieu’s heuristic scheme of the social space, 
since next to economic and cultural capital we included social capital in our analysis (cf. 
Savage et al., 2013). Including social capital does, however, not contradict Bourdieu’s 
account of social class, as Bourdieu argued that classes are positions in the social space 
that is constructed by the distribution of different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1987). 
When a capital form is a source of differentiation that can provide advantage in a certain 
field, it can be considered part of the social space. Social capital contains this property, 
because it enables its holder to derive resources from a network.11
That being said, our measures in this study only partly cover this notion of social 
capital. They do not measure the diversity of contacts or the status of connections in a 
network. Nor did we have a measure of whether people could mobilize their network to 
gain specific resources (Lin, 1999). Yet, by including contact with friends and acquain-
tances we tap into connections that may represent both strong and weak ties 
(Granovetter, 1973) and moreover, our social support measure indicates the resources 
people may obtain through receiving help and being connected to others. Although this 
operationalization might be closer to Putnam’s communal understanding of social 
capital (Putnam, 2000), our analysis detects important differences between social classes. 
For instance, the possibilities for the lower class to obtain informal help are more various 
than those of the precariat. The decline of the lower class may further indicate that 
gentrification contributes to breaking up cohesive communities, which reduces the social 
capital of lower-class residents (Gans, 1982; Young & Willmott, 1986). These differences 
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and processes would not have been observed if social capital had been omitted from the 
analysis. Still, we acknowledge that our analysis is limited in its ability to differentiate 
between classes regarding power in social relations.
Finally, we reflect on our method. In LCA each respondent is assigned to a certain 
class based on probability (Goodman, 2007). For classes that are relatively similar these 
probabilities might be quite close. This implies that belonging to a certain class can be 
arbitrary to some extent, because a minor variation in a respondent’s response on the 
variables might lead to a different classification. In addition, depending on the how the 
variables are coded and which samples are used, the outcomes of LCA might differ (cf. 
Mills, 2014). We applied weights to correct for sample skews and ran the analyses with 
different variable codings. Our main conclusions did not change when we performed a 
number of different analyses (see method section). It signifies, however, that our typology 
should be viewed as one of many perspectives on the urban class structure. We emphasize 
that our classes are “ideal types”, meaning that while they represent the typical features of 
a certain class, not every individual within that class needs to have exactly the same 
features (Hagenaars & Halman, 1989). In the end, a typology should be judged according 
to its analytical strength to provide (new) insights into the social structure of the city and 
its spatial divisions.
Notes
1. Symbolic capital, a fourth type in Bourdieu’s work, is not discussed here.
2. Income and occupation are mostly used as socioeconomic indicators in these studies.
3. The target population consisted of people aged 15 years and older living in the Rotterdam 
municipality. The municipality’s population register was used as sampling framework 
(addresses), complemented with commercial data on telephone numbers. Questionnaires 
were available in Dutch, English, Arabic, and Turkish. In 2008, most questionnaires were 
conducted online (39%) or by phone (39%); in 2017, this was mainly online (59%) or by 
phone (26%).
4. This single imputation was performed in SPSS by the authors. Unfortunately, the preferable 
strategy of multiple imputation could not be combined with our latent class analysis. The 
results did, however, not substantially change when the analysis was repeated with different 
single imputations.
5. Even though education is primarily a measure of the “institutionalized” state of cultural 
capital, acting as a “certificate of cultural competence” in society (Bourdieu, 1986), it also 
measures the potential to accumulate economic capital since education indicates a person’s 
level of skills and training – their human capital (Becker, 1964). Education is thus a 
somewhat ambiguous variable in social class analysis (see Houtman, 2001).
6. The BIC is calculated as −2LL + m * ln(n), where −2LL is −2 times the log-likelihood of the 
model, m is the number of estimated parameters, and n is the number of observations.
7. We thank Reviewer 3 for the suggestions on this part.
8. We did not use the label “elite” here to describe this class, because we think this label should 
be reserved for an even smaller and more privileged segment of society (cf. Savage et al., 
2015b).
9. The categories are specified according to equal intervals, enabling comparison between 
different maps. Areas that have missing data are either nonresidential neighborhoods, newly 
built neighborhoods or neighborhoods that were not part of Rotterdam in 2008.
10. This process bears some resemblance to “super-gentrification” (see Butler & Lees, 2006), but 
differs in at least two ways. First, the established upper class possesses less capital than the 
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elite “super-gentrifiers” from New York or London and second, the Rotterdam waterfronts 
areas were not middle-class enclaves but rather business districts or social housing areas.
11. Without being very explicit on this issue, Bourdieu (1987) states that social capital is 
secondary to economic and cultural capital concerning class positions.
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